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ATYPICAL INVENTIONS
Sean B. Seymore*
Patent law is constantly evolving to accommodate advances in science
and technology. But, for a variety of reasons, some aspects of patent doctrine
have not evolved over time leading to a growing disconnect between the patent
system and certain technical communities. Particularly vulnerable to the ill
effects of this disconnect are "atypical" inventions, which this Article defines as
those in which either (1) a technical aspect of the invention or the inventive
process does not conform to an established legal standard in patent law or (2)
the technical underpinnings of the invention depart from well-established scien-
tific paradigms. An example of the former is an invention which occurs by
accident; an example of the latter is an invention which seems incredible in
light of contemporary knowledge in the relevant field. Since these inventions
often spark a paradigm shift in scientific and technological understanding,
they have a high likelihood of stimulating significant creative activity and ulti-
mately promoting the patent system's overarching goal to promote scientific and
technological progress. Thus, this Article argues that the patent system should
evolve to better accommodate these inventions.
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[C]reativity, in the form of ideas, innovations, and inventions, has
replaced gold, colonies, and raw materials as the new wealth of
nations.1
INTRODUCTION
Patent law is one of the most dynamic areas of the law because it
must respond as the nature of the invention landscape changes to
reflect advances in science and technology.2 That being said, patent
1 FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARs 3 (1994).
2 A famous example is the removal of judicially imposed limitations on patent-
eligible subject matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (hold-
ing that live, genetically engineered microorganisms are patentable); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Technological Change and the Subject
Matter Boundaries of the Patent System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIEs 327, 327-57
(Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (providing commentary).
This responsiveness is not surprising because "any law[s] purporting to provide a reg-
ulatory foundation for innovation must be able to account for both the broad range
of technologies and the rapid pace of [technological] change." R. Polk Wagner, Of
Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. LJ.
1341, 1344 (2003).
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law functions as a one-size-fits-all system in that all inventions-irre-
spective of technological field-must satisfy the same statutory patent-
ability criteria.3 Thus, patent law evolves incrementally through
individual judicial decisions where courts apply the technologically
neutral provisions of the patent statute differently to different tech-
nologies.4 This framework in theory allows the patent system "to
adapt flexibly to both old and new technologies, encompassing 'any-
thing under the sun that is made by man.'5
Yet there is a disconnect between the patent system and science
and technology. Part of the problem stems from the inability of law to
evolve fast enough to keep pace with technological advances:
[The legal system] must run to catch up, and the moment it catches
up, it falls behind again. The simple truth is that law evolves
through a slow, incremental, and deliberative process .... In con-
trast, technology evolves as quickly as the human mind allows. The
result is an increasingly wider "guidance gap"-the space between
the new technology and the old law.
6
3 The conditions for patentability are found in Title 35 of the U.S. Code.
Briefly, the claimed invention must be useful (§ 101), novel (§ 102), nonobvious
(§ 103), and directed to patentable subject matter (§ 101). In addition, § 112 para-
graph 1 requires that the application adequately describe, enable, and set forth the
best mode of carrying out the invention, and § 112 paragraph 2 requires that the
application conclude with claims which delineate the invention with particularity.
Congress enacted the current statute in 1952. See Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (2006)).
4 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can
Solve It 59-65 (2009); see also John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the
Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 518, 544 (2010) (explaining that patent law
"has traditionally had a common law feel to it" because the courts receive little gui-
dance from statutory sources); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predict-
ability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231,
1243-44 (1994) (noting that the general nature of the 1952 Patent Act requires the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to "unavoidably fill[ ] in gaps and
develop[ ] fine points"); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents,
90 B.U. L. REv. 51, 53 (2010) (noting that the common law is "the dominant legal
force in the development of U.S. patent law").
5 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1576 (2003) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). But see ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 203 (2004) (criticizing the one-size-fits-all
regime and asking "whether we should have one set of patent rules that govern all
inventions, or whether the system can be [improved] by tailoring patent rules to the
specific attributes of different technologies"); Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming
the Patent System, 13 MIcH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 489-90 (2007) (arguing
that a one-size-fits-all system leads to suboptimal levels of patent protection).
6 EDwARD LEE LAMOUREUX ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw AND INTERACTIVE
MEDIA 8 (2009); cf Earl Warren, Science and the Law: Change and the Constitution, 12 J.
2011] 2059
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This problem has become even more acute in recent years as technol-
ogy evolves at an ever-increasing pace. 7
But even if a gap is inevitable, three obstacles in the development
of patent jurisprudence have exacerbated it. First, it took the courts a
long time to realize that patent doctrines which emerged during the
Industrial Age were incompatible with chemical and pharmaceutical
inventions.8 Even as inventions from these experimental fields began
to dominate the invention landscape, the courts continued to treat
them as "a child (or orphan) of mechanical patent law."9 Second,
non-technically trained judges struggle to adjudicate patent cases
involving technologically complex subject matter.' 0 This problem
arose nearly a century ago" and shows no signs of abating. 12 Third,
PUB. L. 3, 5 (1963) (explaining that the development of science and technology and
law do not advance hand in hand because "[tihe law lags behind until crisis stirs it
into action.").
7 See Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene
Patents, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 177, 179 (2007) ("As technology advances with an ever-
quickening pace, is patent law agile enough to keep up?"); Joel Reidenberg, Profes-
sor, Fordham Law Sch., Remarks at the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment LawJournal Symposium (Nov. 16, 2007), in Panel P Patent Reform: Can
the Law Keep Pace with Technology?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.rr. L.J. 1025,
1027 (2008) (asking if continued developments in patent law can keep pace with
developing technologies).
8 For instance, before World War II most inventions were electrical or mechani-
cal in nature. As chemical and pharmaceutical inventions began to dominate the
post-war invention landscape, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the
courts tried to fit them into the mold of electrical-mechanical inventions. See John
Hoxie, A Patent Attorney's View, 47J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 630, 636 (1965); William D. Noo-
nan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 263-69 (1990) (describing
how the courts developed a bias against patent applications involving biological sys-
tems and pharmaceutical compounds).
9 Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 768, 783 (1969); see also Hoxie, supra note 8, at 636 (explaining the judiciary's
reluctance to rethink their interpretation the patent statutes when faced with newer
technologies). "This shoehorning [often] led to nonsensical outcomes .... " Sean B.
Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DuKE L.J. 919, 947-48 (2011).
10 "It is an almost universal complaint of patent lawyers that they have to plead
before judges who have no training in the technical aspects of the case, and no ade-
quate way of learning... ." NORBERT WIENER, INVENTION 134 (1993); see alsoJames F.
Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial Bench, 2002 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 425, 428-32 (describing the challenges faced by generalist judges in
patent cases).
11 See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911) ("1 [must call] attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes
it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to
pass upon [patent matters] . . . for only a trained chemist is really capable of passing
upon such facts. . . ."), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir.
2060 [VOL. 86:5
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the courts might be reluctant to develop and modernize the common
law in order to promote stability and predictability in patent law.
13
Together, these obstacles have contributed to the judiciary's develop-
ment of what Professors John Duffy and Craig Nard describe as "an
isolated and sterile jurisprudence that is increasingly disconnected
from the technological communities affected by patent law."
14
1912); In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (observing that the applicant's
disclosure was so complex that if the court "reverse[d] the experts [in the PTO] and
grant[ed] the patent sought, it would be a 'leap in the dark"'). The U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after
its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding prece-
dent. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
12 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1197 (2002) ("Even the Federal Circuit, which does not suffer
nearly so much from these limitations, is not in a position to fully understand all of
the science it encounters." (footnotes omitted)); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping
in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 932-34
(2001) (suggesting that specialized patent trial courts would develop expertise in pat-
ent law and increase accuracy in resolving patent disputes); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1035, 1068-69 (2003) (describing the technical limitations of Federal Circuit judges
and their staff).
13 Cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Cir-
cuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 827 (2008) (arguing that the Federal
Circuit has made great strides in "making patent law more determinate," but that it
has struggled "to keep patent law responsive to changing technological facts and
emerging national interests"); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific
Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on
Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 I-HARv. J.L. & TECH. 79, 109 (2005) ("As time and sci-
ence move forward, the law struggles to keep pace while, at the same time, resisting
change in order to maintain stability." (citation omitted)); see also FED. TRiAE
COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION ch. 6, at 15 & n.90 (2003) (exploring additional
criticisms).
14 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle,
101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620-21 (2007); see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Pat-
enting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1559, 1569 (2006) (arguing that
the restructuring of the scientific enterprise and the problems posed by technological
change should have led to major developments in patent jurisprudence); Senator
Orrin G. Hatch, Keynote Address at The Federal Circuit: The National Appellate
Court Celebration and Introspective Symposium (Mar. 18, 2009), in 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 513, 514 (2010) (arguing that the patent system has not been able to keep up
with innovation because while "[t]he courts have interpreted the law in the light of
change,[ ] that piecemeal process has left areas of the law unclear and out of bal-
ance-leaving some important, unresolved gaps"); Wagner, supra note 2, at 1344 ("To
bind the patent law to the technological assumptions of an earlier era, or to the
maturity of any particular technology, would be exceedingly foolish.").
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Particularly vulnerable to the ill effects of this disconnect are
atypical inventions, which this Article defines as those in which either
(1) a technical aspect of the invention or the inventive process does
not conform to an established legal standard in patent law or (2) the
technical underpinnings of the invention depart from well-established
scientific paradigms. An example of the former is an invention which
occurs by accident; an example of the latter is an invention which
seems incredible in light of contemporary knowledge in the relevant
field.
Two characteristics set atypical inventions apart from others.
First, they are often revolutionary, meaning that the claimed product
or process is radically different from what came before.1 5 Sometimes
these inventions can spark what the great historian and philosopher
of science Thomas Kuhn described as a "paradigm shift" in scientific
and technological understanding. 16 Second, atypical inventions often
represent a significant technological leap forward. This can take the
form of achieving what was previously thought unachievable or trans-
forming a complex process into a simple one. Both paradigm shifts
and technological leaps can unleash the creative potential of the
human mind which, in turn, can create new possibilities 17 and provide
the creative fuel for more inventive activity.' 8
This Article argues that certain established legal standards should
change to better accommodate atypical inventions. The proposal
would not only represent a significant step forward in resolving the
law-technology disconnect but also help fulfill broader goals of patent
policy. 19
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores a
structural bias in current patent doctrine against accidental inven-
tions. After explaining how the status quo can jeopardize the patent
rights of one who invents by accident, this Part proposes an alternative
15 See Michael Hertz, Invention, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATVTy 95, 95 (Mark A.
Runco & Steven R. Pritzker eds., 1999).
16 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66-67, 97-98
(1962). Ultimately the new paradigm becomes the norm unless and until it is too
displaced. Id. at 151.
17 "To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new
angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science." ALBERT EIN-
STEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 92 (1938).
18 See EVAN I. SCHWARTZ, JUICE 11-28 (2004).
19 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that this constitutional command is the "ultimate purpose" of the patent system);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
(" [T] he primary purpose of our patent laws... is 'to promote the progress of science
and useful arts."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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framework which resolves that problem and fulfills broader goals of
patent policy. Part II shows how one who seeks to patent a seemingly
impossible invention can face insurmountable patentability hurdles.
Although there is a need to ferret out truly inoperable inventions, this
Part argues that the subjective nature of the current framework can
exclude inventions with real technical merit. This Part solves this
problem by setting forth a new paradigm rooted in objective, techni-
cal factors. Aside from being more consistent with broader goals of
the patent system, implementing the new paradigm would allow pat-
ent law to remain on the cutting edge of technology.
I. ACCIDENTAL INVENTIONS 20
Accidental inventions are atypical because technical aspects of
the inventive process do not conform to the substantive law of inven-
tion. This Part explains why and illustrates how inventors who invent
by accident can be unjustly deprived of patents.
A. The Inadequacies of the Current Invention Standard
1. The Pathway to Invention
An invention can come into being in two different ways: by plan
or by accident. Planned inventions arise when the inventor formu-
lates a mental picture of the thing which is ultimately patented and
then reduces the thing to practice. By contrast, accidental inventions
arise through serendipity, meaning that the inventor makes some-
thing that was initially unsought.21 The key difference between the
two paths is that in the latter, the inventor can only form a mental
picture of the thing which is ultimately patented after it is made.
Perhaps it is not immediately apparent why the pathway to inven-
tion should matter. Inasmuch as patentability is concerned, the path
to invention is irrelevant because patent law is more concerned with
the thing to be patented rather than the path to the thing or the acu-
men of the person who made it.22 As Professor William Robinson
20 Portions.of this Part draw from my previous work on unplanned inventions.
See Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009).
21 The eminent sociologist Robert K. Merton traces the term to the great eight-
eenth- century author Horace Walpole, who, in reference to the fairy tale The Three
Princes of Serendip, wrote to a friend that these princes were "always making discoveries,
by accidents and sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of." ROBERT K.
MERTON k ELINOR BARBER, THE TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES OF SERENDIPITY 2 (2004).
22 See Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 56 (1887) (explain-
ing that an inventor's ignorance of scientific principles is immaterial as long as the
patent's disclosure sets forth the "thing" to be done so that it can be reproduced);
2011] 2o63
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wrote in his influential treatise on patent law, " [t] he law draws no dis-
tinction between those operations of the creative faculties which man-
ifest themselves in long-continued study and experiment, and those
which reach their end by sudden intuition or apparent accident."23 It
is well settled that "the path that leads an inventor to the invention is
expressly made irrelevant to patentability by statute."24
On the other hand, the pathway to invention can affect when an
invention is invented for patent-obtaining purposes. It is a bedrock
principle of patent law that the inventive process has two elements:
conception and reduction to practice. 25 Since conception cannot
occur until the inventor formulates "a definite and permanent idea of
the complete and operative invention,"26 accidental discoveries, at
least at the moment of the serendipitous event, lack conception. 27 As
discussed below, this idiosyncrasy can be problematic given the impor-
tance of the timing of the conception step in establishing patent
rights.28
2. Unpredictability
The reason why accidental discoveries fail to mesh with the sub-
stantive law of invention is an artifact of the law-technology discon-
nect.29 Since most inventions were predominately mechanical or
electrical in nature during the formative years of patent doctrine, the
Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1930) ("It is with the inven-
tive concept, the thing achieved, not with the manner of its achievement or the qual-
ity of the mind which gave it birth, that the patent law concerns itself."); Earle v.
Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4247) ("It is of no consequence,
whether the thing be simple or complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long,
laborious thought... that it is first done [because the] law looks to the fact, and not
to the process by which it is accomplished.").
23 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 126 &
n.1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890) (citing Crane v. Price, (1842) 134 Eng. Rep.
239 (Ct. Com. Pl.) 249 ("For if the invention be new and useful to the public, it is not
material whether it is the result of long experiments and profound research, or
whether of some sudden and lucky thought, or of mere accidental discovery.")).
24 Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), (2000)).
25 See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); 1 ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 116 ("IT]he inventive act in reality consists
of two acts; one mental, the conception of an idea; the other manual, the reduction of
that idea to practice.").
26 Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376 (quoting 1 ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 532) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
27 See infra Part I.B.
28 See infra Part I.B.2.
29 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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current conception-based invention standard reflects the foreseeabil-
ity and coherency which often characterizes such predictable
technologies.3 0
By contrast, the pathway to invention is fundamentally different
in experimental sciences like chemistry because results are often
uncertain and unexpected. One must often engage in trial and error
to figure out what works and what does not.3 1 It is in these unpredict-
able fields where accidental discovery is a common and widely
acknowledged path to invention.3 2 Teflon 33 and SuperGlue 34 are just
a few examples of substances that emerged from accidental or unex-
pected findings in the laboratory. This Article will focus on chemical
inventions because of their pervasiveness in accidental discovery and
the significant challenges that they have posed for the courts over the
past half-century.
Even within the field of chemistry there are various types of acci-
dental discoveries. For example, a scientist may accidentally discover
a new use for a previously known compound (e.g., LSD, nitroglyc-
erin). 35 This Article does not explore these types of accidents.
Rather, it focuses on the scenario where a reaction (A+B) yields an
accidental, unknown product (X) rather than the expected productQC:
30 The experimental sciences are regarded as "unpredictable" because one often
cannot predict if a reaction protocol that works for one embodiment will work for
others. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. On the other hand, inventions in
applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often regarded as
"predictable" because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a deeper exploration of the predict-
able-unpredictable dichotomy, see Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 136-54 (2008).
31 See Seymore, supra note 30, at 137-39.
32 SeeJOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 63 (2d ed. 1969).
33 Tetrafluoroethylene Polymers, U.S. Patent No. 2,230,654 (filed July 1, 1939).
RoyJ. Plunkett accidentally made the substance at DuPont in 1938. See FRAN CAPO, IT
HAPPENED IN NEWJERSEY 161-62 (2004). Plunkett's original target was a new Freon
compound made from tetrafluoroethylene gas. See ALAN G. ROBINSON & SAM STERN,
CORPORATE CREATrVITY 176 (1997). Rather, the tetrafluoroethylene gas spontaneously
polymerized, which, until then, had been thought impossible. Id. at 176-77.
34 See Alcohol-Catalyzed ca-Cyanoacrylate Adhesive Compositions, U.S. Patent No.
2,768,109 (filed June 2, 1954). Eastman Kodak scientist Harry Coover synthesized
cyanoacrylate with the aim of making optically clear plastic for precision gunsights.
Coover discovered that the new substance was too sticky and "stuck to everything,
almost instantly." Harry W. Coover, Discovery of Superglue Shows Power of Pursuing the
Unexplained, REs. TECH. MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 36, 36.
35 See Hugo Kubinyi, Chance Favors the Prepared Mind-From Serendipity to Rational
Drug Design, 19 J. RECEPTOR & SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION RES. 15, 18-19 (1999).
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A + B - X (not C)
Two features of this type of accidental discovery are worth noting.
First, sometimes the accident occurs not because of the inventor's mis-
conception about C, but rather because of less-than-perfect experi-
mental conditions. Several Nobel Prize-winning accidental
discoveries occurred because of impurities in one of the starting
materials (A or B) or in a reaction vessel.3 6 Second, X's discovery can
trigger a paradigm shift in scientific thinking; particularly if X was
inconceivable, appeared theoretically impossible, or was extremely dif-
ficult to prepare at the time of the serendipitous event.3 7 The corol-
lary is that at a given moment in time, sometimes X can come to light
only through serendipity.
B. Pinpointing Invention
1. Navigating the Current Framework
The inventive process has two steps: conception and reduction to
practice. In the chemical context, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has held that the conception of a
chemical compound requires knowledge of both the structure of the
compound and an operative method of making it.38 An inventor can
satisfy reduction to practice in two ways: actually, by building and test-
ing a physical embodiment of the claimed invention;39 or construc-
tively, by filing a patent application, which contains a disclosure that
36 Key examples include the accidental discoveries of the synthetic dye indigo
(1905 Nobel Prize in Chemistry) and crown ethers (1987 Nobel Prize in Chemistry).
One commentator observes that impurities have played such a major role in impor-
tant discoveries "that one wonders whether our modern, highly purified reagents
have eliminated one fertile source of new chemistry." Peter E. Childs, Chemistry and
Chance: Part 1, CHEMISTRY ACTION!, (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.ul.ie/~childsp/CinA/
issue50/chance.html. Of course, the result (X) did not become reproducible until
the scientists recognized the impurity. See id.
37 A famous example is the accidental discovery in 1985 of buckminsterfullerene,
a remarkably stable cluster of sixty carbon atoms resembling a geodesic dome. See
Harold W. Kroto et al., C60 : Buckminsterfullerene, 318 NATURE 162, 162-63 (1985); E.
osawa, The Evolution of the Football Structure for the C60 Molecule: A Retrospective, in THE
FULLERENES 1, 5-6 (H.W. Kroto & D.R.M. Walton eds., 1993) (recounting how the
researchers initially thought that the synthesis "was almost impossible to realize").
This discovery won the 1996 Nobel Prize in Chemistry.
38 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (citing Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
39 See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). An embodiment
is a physical manifestation of an invention (like a chemical compound or a widget)
described in a patent application or patent. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY 11 (2d ed. 1992).
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presumptively enables a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) 40 to make and use the invention.41
The intricacies of this framework are important because in the
United States, the first to invent is entitled to the patent.42 While the
filing date of the patent application is presumptively the date of inven-
tion, an inventor can establish an earlier date-as far back as the date
of conception-with adequate proof. 43 This is done to overcome or
exclude a prior art reference 4" in patent prosecution, 45 to avoid a
potentially invalidating prior art reference in litigation, 46 or to defeat
40 The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably
prudent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (comparing the PHOSITA to the "'reasonable man' and other ghosts
in the law"). Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical
field include the sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inven-
tor, the educational level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encoun-
tered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which
innovations are made. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
41 See Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1973). A constructive reduc-
tion to practice presumptively satisfies the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112
paragraph 1 (2006). See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also infra note 67 (describing the Court's holding in
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998), that § 102(b) does not require an
actual reduction to practice).
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (giving the first inventor superior rights over
others so long as the inventor has "not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed" the
invention).
43 See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For
example, the inventor can obtain an earlier invention date by showing that it was
physically made before the filing date. Id.
44 Prior art is defined in § 102 as documents (like issued patents and printed
publications), knowledge, and activities which disclose earlier-developed technology.
Prior art falls into two main categories: (1) the "novelty" provisions, § 102(a), (e), and
(g), which depend on the invention date, and (2) the "loss-of-right" provisions of
§ 102(b), which depend on the applicant's filing date.
45 Patent prosecution describes the process by which an inventor, usually through
the help of an attorney, files an application with the PTO for examination. See gener-
ally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAw 42-63 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Supreme
Court's holding that § 102(b) does not require an actual reduction to practice before
an invention can be patented).
46 See Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1576-77 (explaining that once the alleged infringer
has presented prior art that anticipates the claims, the patentee has the burden to
offer evidence showing he invented the subject matter before the publication date of
the prior art document). Patent litigation focuses on issued patents. A patentee
whose rights have been infringed can compel an accused infringer to stop the infring-
ing activity and pay for damages arising from the infringement that has already
occurred. See MUELLER, supra note 45, at 325-31.
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another party's claim to the invention.47 Thus, the precise timing of
inventive events can be important.
While navigating through this framework can be cumbersome for
planned inventions, for accidental discoveries its formalistic applica-
tion is theoretically untenable, unrealistic, and can produce unfavora-
ble or absurd results for the serendipper. To understand why and
help focus the discussion that follows, consider the following hypo-
thetical example tracing the steps of an accidental invention.48
On Day One, a scientist conducts what is expected to be a
straightforward synthesis of a known organic compound, C. The sci-
entist predicts that mixing A (a colorless liquid) with a pinch of B
(iron chloride, an off-white powder added to speed up the reaction) 49
will yield C (also a colorless liquid). Although no one has previously
reported preparing C by this route, knowledge in the field suggests
that it should work. Accordingly, the scientist adds A and B to a flask
and begins stirring the mixture. A few hours later, the scientist
returns to the lab and finds that an unexpected bright orange powder,
X, has settled to the bottom of the flask! The orange color indicates
that X contains iron. At this point, the scientist immediately begins to
isolate and purify X, which takes the remainder of the day. On Day
Two, the scientist begins structure elucidation. The first test reveals
that X is an aromatic compound, indicating that it will be unusually
stable. Other tests throughout the day support this preliminary struc-
tural assignment. Yet, since a metal (iron) is involved, the scientist
cannot make a definitive structure determination until obtaining an
X-ray analysis of the compound. On Day Three, the X-ray data con-
47 Patent rights are only awarded to the first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(barring issuance of a patent when another inventor has made the invention before
the applicant). When two parties claim the same invention, a PTO tribunal known as
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences institutes an "interference" proceed-
ing to determine priority (i.e., which party is entitled to a patent). See infra note 59.
48 This hypothetical example is very loosely based on ferrocene, the discovery and
characterization of which led to the 1973 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. The researchers
set out to make an organic compound (a colorless liquid) but instead recovered an
orange powder of "remarkable stability." See T.J. Kealy & P.L. Pauson, A New Type of
Organo-Iron Compound, 168 NATURE 1039, 1040 (1951); see also Peter L. Pauson, Fer-
rocene-How It All Began, 637-39 J. ORGANOMETALLIC CHEMISTRY 3, 3-6 (2001) (dis-
cussing the discovery of ferrocene). Ferrocene is the first and best-known example of
a metallocene which, in simple terms, describes a metal atom encapsulated between
two aromatic rings. Its discovery and characterization spawned the rapid growth of
organometallic chemistry in the second half of the twentieth century.
49 B is called a catalyst. These are substances (often metals) which speed up a
reaction. Catalysts are typically recovered upon the completion of the reaction. See
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 90 (James Trefil ed., 2001).
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firm X's structure: it is indeed an iron-containing aromatic com-
pound. Next, the scientist repeats the synthesis and obtains the same
result, X on Day Four. Diligent testing over the next few weeks shows
that X and its derivatives are useful in polymers, catalysis, and electro-
chemistry. In light of this utility, the scientist decides to file a patent
application. 50
2. Problems
a. Conception
The current invention framework is ill equipped to handle this
scenario. Precisely when did conception occur? Clearly, it is impossi-
ble for conception to exist at the moment of the serendipitous event
because, at that point, the inventor does not yet know the specific
chemical structure of X51 Indeed, applying the current framework to
this chronology suggests that X cannot be "invented" until later.5 2
Pinpointing conception is tricky.53 It appears that the earliest
date that the scientist had an idea of X's structure was on Day Two. By
this point, the scientist clearly had a complete mental picture of Xand
could define X by its method of preparation as well as by its physical
and chemical properties.5 4 Thus, on Day Two, the scientist could suf-
ficiently distinguish X from other compounds.55 Although one could
argue that this idea did not become "definite and permanent" until
the X-ray data arrived on Day Three, these data did not alter the speci-
ficity of the scientist's idea.56 In sum, under the current law, it
appears that Day Two is the earliest possible date of conception.
50 One cannot obtain a patent on a compound merely because it is novel; it must
also be useful. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966). Utility is deter-
mined as of the applicant's filing date. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 n.19 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
51 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
52 For a rare exception, see infra note 58, discussing the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice.
53 See Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
(describing conception as "a pivotal if somewhat nebulous notion in patent law");
Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2175,
2186 (2000) (referring to conception as "a technical concept").
54 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(explaining that conception of a chemical compound is lacking until the inventor
"[is] able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how
to obtain it" (citing Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
55 See supra note 38.
56 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (noting that subsequent experimentation that reveals uncertainty as to the
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b. Reduction to Practice
An actual reduction to practice probably did not occur until Day
Four even though X was physically isolated on Day One. Under the
current framework, the initial accident on Day One cannot serve as a
reduction to practice because at that time the scientist did not con-
temporaneously recognize and appreciate X's structure. 57 Recall that
this did not happen until at least Day Two. Thus, it appears that the
actual reduction to practice occurred on Day Four when the experi-
ment was repeated.58 This is absurd because it suggests that unex-
pected discoveries require at least two sets of experiments to establish
an actual reduction to practice: the initial accident that leads to con-
ception and a following experiment to reduce the conceived idea to
practice. One would think that making the compound once in the
form that is subsequently claimed should be sufficient to establish an
actual reduction to practice.
c. Priority Issues
How might this time lag affect the scientist's patent rights? It can
become important if the scientisthas to prove the date of invention in
order to avoid patent-defeating prior art or to prevail in a contest with
chemical's specific structure or identity can undermine conception and render it
incomplete).
57 See Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining that conception and reduction to practice cannot be established retroac-
tively because there must be contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the
invention).
58 This reasoning is in accord with the general rule under the conception-reduc-
tion to practice framework that "[r]eduction to practice follows conception."
Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996). There is a narrow
exception known as the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to prac-
tice (SCRTP). See Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 159 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (establishing
the doctrine). SCRTP arises in the rare instance where an inventor cannot formulate
a complete picture of the invention until "reduc[ing] the invention to practice
through a successful experiment." Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229; cf Alpert v.
Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that the doctrine is reserved for
"a residuum of cases where results at each step do not follow as anticipated, but are
achieved empirically by what amounts to trial and error"). For an example of the
doctrine's application, see Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206, which held that for an invention
claiming a purified DNA sequence for encoding a protein, conception did not occur
until after the fragment had been isolated and characterized. In sum, SCRTP arises
when actual experimentation (which is also sufficient to fulfill the requirements of
reduction to practice) is necessary to supply the knowledge to complete conception.
See 2 R. CARL MoY, Mov's WALKER ON PATENTs § 8:54 (4th ed. 2007). Turning to the
hypothetical example used in the text, since it is clear that one could have formulated
a mental picture of X before engaging in experimentation, SCRTP need not apply.
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another inventor over the right to claim X To illustrate the latter,
consider the following hypothetical. Assume that while the scientist's
patent application for X is pending in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), the examiner becomes aware of an application filed by
another party who also claims X. To determine which party is entitled
to the patent, the examiner declares an interference. 59 During the
proceeding the other party submits evidence that establishes its con-
ception of X on Day One followed by reasonable diligence toward a
constructive reduction to practice. 60 Since the scientist cannot estab-
lish an earlier date of conception, the other party wins even though it
filed its application last and never actually reduced Xto practice! This
unfortunate outcome reflects a structural bias in current patent doc-
trine against accidental inventions.
C. An Alternative Approach
1. Rethinking Invention Completeness
It is time for the patent system to adopt an invention paradigm
that better accommodates accidental discoveries. 61 One possibility is
to dispel the notion that every invention must begin with conception.
An alternative approach would allow the moment of the serendipitous
59 See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006). The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
determines which party is entitled to a patent. See supra note 47. The party that first
reduced the invention to practice usually wins; however, a party that was "first to con-
ceive the invention but last to reduce it to practice" (either actively or constructively)
will win if that party "demonstrates reasonable diligence [toward] reduction to prac-
tice." Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing § 102 (g)).
60 See Sletzinger v. Lincoln, 410 F.2d 808, 810 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (exemplifying the
rule in a chemical example); Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1937)
(articulating the rule). Preparation of the patent application can count as reasonable
diligence toward a constructive reduction to practice. See Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d
1024, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
61 There is little doubt that the current patent laws value mental activity over
physical activity. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (" [T]he word
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception
rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea."); Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at
1227 ("Conception is the touchstone of inventorship .... "); Dan L. Burk, Feminism
and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 183, 192-93
(2007) ("[P]atent law elevate [s] mental effort over physical effort, conceptual produc-
tion over material production .... [The physical] portions of the creative process are
excluded, invisible, [and] unrecognized. This version of creative effort effectively...
attribute [s] the entirety of creative production to a particular, discrete act of creative
vision.").
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event to serve as the invention date as long as the isolation of X is
coupled with reasonable diligence toward elucidating its structure. 62
The theoretical underpinnings for it already exist in case law.
The relevant cases wrestle with the extent to which an invention must
be developed before prefiling commercialization activity bars its pat-
entability. The on-sale provision of § 102(b) of the Patent Act bars
patentability if the invention was on sale more than a year before fil-
ing.63 It serves to strike a balance between an inventor's need for ade-
quate time after the sales activity to assess the value of a potential
patent and the needs of the public, who may have come to believe
that the invention is now in the public domain.64 A key question is
when does an invention reach the stage at which the on-sale bar
attaches. The Supreme Court resolved this question more than a dec-
ade ago in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,65 when it decided whether a
written purchase order for mechanical sockets not physically made
before the critical date was sufficient to have placed the invention "on
sale." 66 The Court held that the invention must be "ready for patent-
ing"67 to trigger the one-year clock; a condition that is satisfied "by
proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that
prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other
descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a
[PHOSITA] to practice [it]. "68
62 Returning to the hypothetical, under this alternative framework X became a
patentable invention on Day One because the serendipper began reasonable dili-
gence toward structure elucidation immediately after isolation and purification of the
compound.
63 A patent is invalid if "the invention was ... on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."
§ 102(b).
64 See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(discussing the underlying policies of the on-sale bar).
65 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
66 See id. at 57-60. The "critical date" is the date "one year before the date on
which the patent application was filed." Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 23
F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2001). So, for example, if an inventor filed an application
on April 19, 1982, the critical date for § 102(b) purposes is April 19, 1981. If a trigger-
ing event occurred before the earlier date, the inventor (and for that matter, anyone
else) has lost the right to a patent. See Pfaff 525 U.S. at 57-58.
67 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. The Court explained that § 102(b) does not require an
actual reduction to practice before an invention can be patented. See id. at 60
("[T]he word 'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's
conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea.").
68 Id. at 67-68. Applying this condition to the facts, the Pfaff Court decided that
the patent at issue was invalid because the inventor had "prepared detailed engineer-
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What is more important for present purposes is that after Pfaff,
the Federal Circuit held that proof of conception is not required for
an invention to be ready for patenting if it is physically made and sold
in its claimed form.69 The key case on point is Abbott Laboratories v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,70 in which the Federal Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment of invalidity because Abbott's claimed drug was
offered for sale more than a year before filing. 71 The parties did not
dispute that a third party had sold the specifically claimed Form IV of
the drug more than a year before Abbott's filing date. Yet, Abbott
argued that the sale was not for the patented invention because the
parties did not know at the time of the sale that the material sold
contained Form IV. In rejecting Abbott's contention that there can
be no on-sale bar unless conception of the invention has been proven,
the Federal Circuit held that there was no requirement that the par-
ties understand the details of what was sold. 72 According to the court,
the mere fact that the material was sold was conclusive and obviated
any need for inquiry into conception. 73 Thus, " [t]he Federal Circuit
held... that the invention had been reduced to practice even though
it had yet to be conceived." 74
Abbott's lesson is that if the invention sold or offered for sale is
physically made in the form that is subsequently claimed, it is suffi-
ing drawings that described the design, the dimensions, and the materials to be used
in making the socket." Id. at 58, 68-69.
69 SeeAbbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("We disagree that proof of conception was required. The fact that the claimed mate-
rial was sold under circumstances in which no question existed that it was useful
means that it was reduced to practice."); Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d
1378, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Nor is there a requirement that [the patentee] must
have recognized the significance of these limitations at the time of offer. If the [mate-
rial] offered for sale ... possessed each of the claim limitations, then [it] was on sale,
whether or not the seller recognized that his [material] possessed the claimed charac-
teristics." (citations omitted)).
70 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
71 See id. at 1318-19.
72 Id. at 1319 ("If a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses each of
the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether or not the parties
to the transaction recognize that the product possesses the claimed characteristics.").
73 See id. at 1318-19. But see Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the
More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for
Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 958 n.142 (2000) (arguing
that the court rigidly applied Pfaff and adopted a strict interpretation of reduction to
practice). But the on-sale bar may not be triggered if additional development of the
invention occurs after the offer for sale because it might indicate that the invention
was not complete. See Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d
1076, 1080-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68 n.14).
74 Holbrook, supra note 73, at 958 n.142.
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ciently complete and ready for patenting for § 102 (b) purposes even
if the inventor does not know all of its characteristics or have a com-
plete mental picture of it. Although this is an unlikely scenario for
predictable inventions like the mechanical socket at issue in Pfaff it
can arise in chemistry and other unpredictable fields which are prone
to accidental discovery.75
Given that conception is not required for § 102(b) purposes, it is
hard to understand why it must be required for patent-obtaining pur-
poses. Turning back to the hypothetical, if the substance obtained at
the time of the accident, X, is the form that will be claimed, the seren-
dipitous event, supported with adequate proof,76 should be sufficient
to establish an invention date for priority purposes even though the
inventor's precise knowledge of the structure comes shortly thereaf-
ter. Put somewhat differently, when the initial accident is followed by
reasonable diligence toward structure elucidation, the events are so
connected "that they are substantially one continuous act."' 77 Thus,
there should be symmetry between invention completeness for patent-
defeating purposes and for patent-obtaining purposes. 78
75 See supra Part I.A.2; infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
76 A witnessed or signed inventor's notebook, as well as other documentary and
physical evidence generated in the laboratory, can serve as sufficient evidence of
reduction to practice. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169-70
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
77 Cf Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
person 'who first conceives... may date his patentable invention back to the time of
its conception, if he connects the conception with its reduction to practice by reasona-
ble diligence on his part, so that they are substantially one continuous act."' (quoting
Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69, 76 (6th Cir. 1893))).
78 In discussing Abbott and related cases, two commentators contend that "the
determining factor appears to be that the public has already benefited from the pres-
ence of the claimed invention in the prior art, even though it may not have been
aware of the invention itself." Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 371, 379 (2005). But they point out that priority cases are distinguisha-
ble because (in accord with Federal Circuit jurisprudence) the ability to describe the
compound in detail is required to show possession. See id. at 394. Accordingly, they
argue that an asymmetry makes sense as a policy matter because "an inherent but
unappreciated prior use that benefits the public will not qualify for a patent, but it will
prevent others from later patenting the invention being used." Id. While public ben-
efit can explain the outcome in Abbott, returning to the hypothetical, knowledge of
X's structure at the time of the accident should be the sine qua non for showing
possession on Day One, particularly since structural details are diligently obtained
shortly thereafter.
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2. Policy Considerations
a. Tradeoffs
One potential criticism of this approach is that it rewards discov-
ery at the expense of other goals of the patent system. For example,
returning to the priority contest presented above, one could argue
that awarding priority to the party that first conceived of Xs structure
(but never actually reduced it to practice) is proper because it fosters
rigorous investigation, encourages early disclosure, and promotes effi-
cient investment in innovation.79
Yet the broad ex ante incentives for invention and early disclo-
sure can also thwart innovation.80 For example, returning to the pri-
ority contest discussed above, if the party awarded priority to X lacks
the capacity or interest in either actually reducing it to practice them-
selves or licensing the patent to other innovators who might conduct
further research (which could lead to a commercial product), then
the end result might be a hangup or holdout.81 Clearly the party that
won the patent race is probably not the best or most efficient user of
the technology.
8 2
79 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
472 (2004) ("By allowing a patent to occur before firms commit the bulk of the
expenditures necessary to develop the invention, the prospect system reduces wasteful
expenditures on duplication and thus makes the process of investing in innovation
more efficient."); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L.
& ECON. 265, 267-70 (1977) (arguing that broad patents should be granted for tech-
nological "prospects" at an early stage of research and development); Dana Rohra-
bacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 263, 271
(1995) (arguing that the ability to obtain patent protection at the early stages of the
inventive process is necessary to maintain the incentive for the investment of venture
capital in research and development).
80 See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 659-61 (2010).
81 See Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMoRY
LJ. 823, 824-27 (2000). While it is true that the losing party (or other innovators)
can obtain an improvement patent for X, a novel and nonobvious variant of X, the
holder of this (narrower) patent cannot practice X'without a license from the holder
of the (broader) patent to X See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 860-61 (1990) (describing
"dominant" and "subservient" patents). For the sake of completeness, it is also true
that the holder of the patent to X cannot practice X without a license. See id. at 861
n.96. ("Where one patent is an improvement on another patent, 'neither of the two
patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other without the other's consent."'
(quoting Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886))).
82 See Long, supra note 81, at 823.
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b. On Disclosure and Follow-on Innovation
An oft-touted justification for the patent system is that society
receives some benefit from the invention's disclosure in exchange for
the patentee's right to exclude. But all too often the public gets the
short end of the stick in this so-called patent bargain. 83 Accidental
inventions, however, hold up their end of the bargain in two signifi-
cant ways. First, since X is always physically reduced to practice before
filing of the patent application, the patent document will invariably
provide comprehensive technical details about X,84 which, in turn,
will substantially contribute to the public storehouse of knowledge.8 5
This point is very important because one major criticism of patents is
that they "seldom teach enough so that someone can actually go out
and actually [practice] the invention without some additional work."86
And in experimental fields like chemistry where results are often
unpredictable and unexpected,8 7 there is a real danger that claimed
embodiments which are inadequately described either cannot be
made or may require unduly extensive experimentation. 8
8
83 See Seymore, supra note 30, at 143-54 (identifying problems with the current
disclosure standard).
84 This will include experimental details about how to make and characterize X,
which would be akin to the technical information one would find in a research jour-
nal. Yet it is possible, as the hypothetical example illustrates, that the scientist will
need to engage in additional, postaccident experimentation to satisfy other patenta-
bility requirements. For example, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
85 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that
when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the
"general store of knowledge" and assumedly will stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances in the art); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting that adding to knowledge is required by the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
86 Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack ThereoJ), 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2007, 2024-25 (2005) (citation omitted). This is true, at least in part, because an
inventor need not create a working embodiment or engage in any experimentation
before obtaining the patent. Rather, an inventor can describe an invention with ficti-
tious, constructed examples (which is entirely consistent with the doctrine of con-
structive reduction to practice). See Seymore, supra note 30, at 143-45.
87 See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[R]eplacing a single func-
tional group on a chemical compound can often have highly unpredictable results.").
88 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 n. 17 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("In the field of chem-
istry generally there may be times when the well-known unpredictability of chemical
reactions will alone be enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a
particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim." (quoting In
re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971))); Seymore, supra note 30, at 138.
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The danger of inadequate disclosure is essentially absent for acci-
dental inventions because they are actually made. The resulting pat-
ents, often replete with working examples, are technically robust
documents which provide a specific and useful teaching.89 Given that
disclosure is the principal benefit that the public receives in exchange
for the patentee's right to exclude, 90 the knowledge that comes from
an accidental discovery is precisely the type that the patent system
should want to fill the shelves of the public storehouse. 9 1
Second, the accidental discovery of X often leads to significant
follow-on innovation. The invented subject matter often involves the
"things that make everyday living more convenient, pleasant, healthy,
or interesting. ' '9 2 Innovators will direct research and development
efforts toward second-generation products, which will hopefully be
significant improvements over X itself.
The underlying science surrounding the accidental discovery is
often new and exciting. Scientific principles and laws that were seem-
ingly well understood and settled are suddenly thrust wide open when
X is discovered.9 3 History shows that X is often something that the
scientific community once thought was theoretically impossible to
make or, at the very least, incredibly difficult to prepare. But the acci-
dent opens new frontiers for exploration. After the initial bewilder-
ment, the accident tends to spawn two types of inquiry: basic research,
which seeks to elucidate mechanistic and structural details; and
applied research, which seeks to stretch the boundaries of Xby tweak-
ing the concept to make improvements that are even more valuable
than X itself. And, of course, innovators will seek to obtain patent
protection for these improvements as well as for the methods of mak-
ing and using them.
89 See Seymore, supra note 80, at 653-55.
90 The Court often describes disclosure as the quid pro quo for the inventor's
right to exclude. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he
patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.").
91 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92 ROYSTON M. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY, at ix (1989).
93 A serendipitous event "involves a wild leap outside the limits of what was until
that moment supposed, and thereby enables science to advance into domains of
understanding that were not previously imagined." JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 217
(2000) (footnote omitted).
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II. INCREDIBLE INVENTIONS9 4
A. Assessing Credibility
1. Red Flags in the Patent Office
The quest to achieve incredible results has long provided creative
fuel for inventors. 95 Yet inventors who purport to have made techno-
logical breakthroughs often face skepticism and disbelief. Indeed,
applications disclosing perpetual motion machines, cold fusion
processes, and other inventions that either challenge well-established
scientific principles or simply appear impossible on their face raise
red flags in the PTO. 96
The oft-cited statutory basis for rejecting these applications is
§ 101 of the Patent Act, which only permits patents for "useful" inven-
tions.97 In patent law, an invention is not useful if it cannot operate to
produce the intended result.98 The test for operability is whether a
PHOSITA99 has reason to doubt the objective truth of the applicant's
assertions.100
While the operability requirement of § 101 serves a laudable
gatekeeping function, it has drawbacks. First, elucidating what a
PHOSITA would believe may devolve into a subjective judgment
about the subject matter. At some point this may lead the PTO and
the courts to develop a bias toward unpatentability with inventions
94 This Part forms the preliminary piece of a larger project exploring the
patentability of seemingly impossible inventions.
95 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
96 For example, when an applicant claims a perpetual motion machine, the
examiner can request a working model. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MAN-
UAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.03 (8th ed. 2001, rev. 2008) [hereinafter
MPEP]. This is an exception to the general rule that an applicant need not actually
reduce an invention to practice before obtaining a patent. See supra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
97 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... may obtain a patent.... .").
98 See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("The utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 mandates that any patentable
invention be useful and, accordingly, the subject matter of the claim must be opera-
ble."); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A] device lacks
utility [if] ...it does not operate to produce what [the inventor] claims [that] it
does." (quoting Newman v. Quigg, 681 F. Supp. 16, 23 (D.D.C. 1988))).
99 The PHOSITA is defined supra note 40.
100 The PTO can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant's disclosure "sug-
gest[s] an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve[s] implausible scientific
principles." In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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emerging from new, poorly understood, and paradigm-shifting tech-
nologies as well as those from fields with a poor track record of suc-
cess as the most vulnerable. Second, since the PTO and the courts are
probably unaware of what is happening at the cutting edge of science
and technology, what happens if the impossible becomes possible?
History reveals that the PTO and the courts will continue to deny pat-
ents under § 101 for a long time thereafter. This lag is unsettling
since "the very purpose of the patent system is to encourage [the]
attainment of previously unachievable results."''1
2. Examining Incredible Inventions
The PTO undertakes a two-step analysis to gauge operability.
First, the examiner must construe the relevant claims in the patent
application to precisely define the invention to be tested for compli-
ance with § 101.102 Second, if it appears that the invention cannot
operate to produce the intended results, the examiner must assess
credibility by asking if a PHOSITA would believe what the applicant
has asserted. If the answer is no, the invention is unpatentable under
§ 101 for lack of utility and under § 112 paragraph 1 for lack of
enablement. 10 3 This dual rejection makes sense because an applicant
cannot possibly enable a PHOSITA to practice an invention that does
not work.104
Next, an evidentiary burden-shifting process begins. The appli-
cant's disclosure initially enjoys a presumption of truth, meaning that
the examiner must initially presume that the invention can operate to
produce the intended result.10 5 But if examination suggests that a
PHOSITA would reasonably doubt the objective truth of the appli-
cant's assertions, the examiner must establish a prima facie case of
unpatentability by coming forward with factual evidence of non-
101 In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
102 See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983). During
examination, the examiner must give claim terms their broadest reasonable interpre-
tation as they would be understood by a PHOSITA yet consistent with the applicant's
disclosure. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
103 An applicant must enable a PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention
without undue experimentation. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
104 See In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The how to use
prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 .... If the application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the
application also fails as a matter of law to enable [a PHOSITA] to use the invention
under 35 U.S.C. § 112." (citations omitted)).
105 See In re Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1357.
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credibility. 10 6 If the examiner cannot adduce the evidence, the PTO
must issue a patent if the applicant satisfies the other requirements for
patentability. 10 7
If the examiner establishes a prima facie case of inoperability, the
applicant can either attack it108 or rebut it with persuasive arguments
or additional evidence sufficient to convince a PHOSITA to accept the
applicant's assertions as true.10 9 Though the burden of production
may continue to shift as each side presents new evidence,11 0 the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion rests with the examiner." 1I
Whether an invention is operable under § 101 is a question of
fact.1 12 An invention rejected for inoperability under § 101 also faces
rejection for lack of enablement under § 112 paragraph 1 because the
applicant cannot teach a PHOSITA how to use something that does
not work."13 Whether a disclosure is enabling is a "legal conclusion
based on underlying factual inquiries." 114
106 In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Evidentiary sources
may include peer-reviewed materials, non-peer-reviewed materials, anecdotal informa-
tion, information from related technologies, and logic. See In re Dash, 118 F. App'x
488, 491 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
107 See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108 An applicant can likely mount a successful attack if the examiner produces no
(or insufficient) documentary evidence to support a finding of inoperability; con-
tends that the invention is crude or inferior; or compels the inventor to explain pre-
cisely how or why an invention works. See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber
Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1911) (explaining that an inventor need not under-
stand the scientific principles underlying the invention); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that with respect to core facts, the PTO cannot
simply draw conclusions as to what is common knowledge without concrete eviden-
tiary support); Custom Accessories, Inc. v.Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960
n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is possible for an invention to be less effective than existing
devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria for patentability."); MPEP, supra
note 96, § 2107.02 (encouraging examiners to provide documentary evidence when-
ever possible).
109 See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). But see In re
Novak, 306 F.2d 924, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (noting that rebuttal evidence is unneces-
sary if a PHOSITA would obviously accept the applicant's allegations as true).
110 When the applicant submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must "start over"
and "consider all of the evidence anew." In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
111 Absent any other grounds of unpatentability, the applicant is entitled to the
patent. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
112 See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
113 See cases cited supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
114 In re Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews a finding
of (in)operability and the factual issues underlying enablement deferentially. In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that for appeals from the
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B. Limits of the Current Paradigm
1. Proof Problems
Gauging operability is easiest when the applicant can point to
actual experimental data or a working model to prove that the inven-
tion works.1 15 But unlike the rules of mainstream science, which
"require actual performance of every experimental detail" as a prereq-
uisite for publication, in patent law an inventor only needs to provide
sufficient technical information to teach a PHOSITA how to practice
the invention without undue experimentation. 1 16 This means that an
applicant usually does not need to actually reduce an invention to
practice or produce a physical embodiment of it in order to obtain a
patent. 117
The key challenge for the PTO is gauging operability without
actual proof. Aside from cases involving perpetual motion machines,
where there is a working model requirement,1 1 8 the PTO allows appli-
cants to choose their own way of establishing operability when the
examiner questions it.119
2. The Credibility Lag in Science
The PTO can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant's asser-
tions suggest an "inherently unbelievable undertaking,"1 20 "involve
implausible scientific principles,"1 21 appear to "run[ ] counter to what
would be believed would happen by the [PHOSITA],"122 or emerge
from fields ridden with fraud or from which "little of a successful
nature has been developed."' 23 In each situation, the examiner must
PTO, the court reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial
evidence).
115 Cf Seymore, supra note 80, at 652-53 (advocating a working example require-
ment for complex technologies which would, among other things, simplify the
enablement analysis).
116 See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).
117 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
118 To begin, the patent statute permits the examiner to request a working model
of an invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2006) ("The Director may require the applicant
to furnish a model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously the several parts of his
invention."). However, the PTO rarely invokes the requirement unless the invention
involves perpetual motion. See supra note 96.
119 See MPEP, supra note 96, at § 608.03.
120 In reJolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
121 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
122 In re Pottier, 376 F.2d 328, 330 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (citation omitted).
123 In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (citation omitted).
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turn to mainstream science to determine if the applicant's assertions
are (in)credible in light of contemporary knowledge in the field.
Thus, credibility in mainstream science and operability in patent law
are tightly linked.
At this point it is necessary to briefly explain how mainstream sci-
ence assesses credibility. It occurs primarily through the legitimiza-
tion process known as peer review.124 The ultimate publication
decision 125 serves as a "knowledge filter" where the journal editors
and reviewers act as the gatekeepers. 126 Through "organized skepti-
cism," 12 7 the gatekeepers carry out their mission " [t]o promote origi-
nal ideas, valuable approaches, or new methods and to reject the
mediocre ones."' 28
Peer review, however, has serious drawbacks that can affect patent
law. 129 The major one is that the peer review process can delay, hin-
der, or block the dissemination of novel ideas. 130 Quantitative studies
and anecdotal sources reveal that reviewers resist change. 31 They will
124 See HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYrH OF THE SCIENTIFIC
METHOD 44-48 (1992). The mechanics of peer review typically works as follows. First,
the researcher submits the work to a journal. Second, the editor sends it to one or
more reviewers knowledgeable about the problem to judge its merit (uniqueness,
methodology, adequacy of research design, and potential contribution to the field).
Third, the editor makes a final publication decision. See Peter Hernon & Candy
Schwartz, Peer Review Revisited, 28 LIBR. & INFO. SC. RES. 1, 1 (2006).
125 See supra note 124.
126 See FREDERICK GRINNELL, EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE 75 (2009) (noting that
a scientist with a new research claim must "get by the gatekeepers").
127 ZIMAN, supra note 93, at 246.
128 Juan Miguel Campanario, Have Referees Rejected Some of the Most-Cited Articles of
All Times?, 47J. AM. SOC'Y INFO. SCI. 302, 302 (1996).
129 Relatedly, peer review has been the subject of considerable criticism from
those within and outside of mainstream science. See, e.g., ELIEZER GEISLER, THE MET-
RICS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 234 (2000) (collecting criticisms); Campanario,
supra note 128, at 302 (arguing that peer review hinders good science); Rustum Roy
&James R. Ashburn, The Perils of Peer Review, 414 NATURE 393, 393-94 (2001) (same).
130 See Raymond E. Spier, Peer Review and Innovation, 8 ScI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS
99, 102 (2002). For stories and examples of delayed recognition, see Bernard Barber,
Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596, 597-602 (1961), providing
examples dating back to the nineteenth century; David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical
Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1438,
1440-41 (1990), providing eighteen examples; and Moti Nissani, The Plight of the
Obscure Innovator in Science: A Few Reflections on Campanario's Note, 25 Soc. STUD. SCI.
165, 171-76 (1995), supplying forty-seven examples.
131 As one scientist argues, "[It] is not permissible . . . to write or say something
which contradicts the shared paradigm, and expect it to be tolerated .... because the
shared paradigm, a necessary frame of reference in normal scientific communication,
would be undermined." Ivor Catt, The Rise and Fall of Bodies of Knowledge, 12 INFO.
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often reject anything that clashes with then-existing ideas and gener-
ally accepted theories. 132 Many other factors enter into a reviewer's
calculus, including: conservatism, 133 bias, 134 jealously, 13 5 fears of
offending the science establishment, 136 an overwhelming interest in
quality control, 137 and the inability to recognize brilliance. 138 In sum,
whether and when the credibility gate opens is highly subjective and
idiosyncratic.
The major downside of this credibility lag for the inventor is that
it can compromise patent rights. Patent procurement is highly time
sensitive. To illustrate, consider an inventor who files a patent appli-
cation disclosing a seemingly impossible invention at time T. The
examiner will turn to mainstream science to determine if the appli-
cant's assertions are (in)credible in light of contemporary knowledge
SCIENTIST 137, 138-39 (1978), reprinted in IVOR CATr, THE CATr ANOMALY app. 1, at
31, 33 (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.ivorcatt.com/28anom.htm. Often it is
better for a scientist to "stop[ ] producing new, and perhaps unsettling, ideas"
because "[r]ewriting or extending the best work of others, or one's best pieces ...
could be easier, more rewarding, and more acceptable." Graciela Chichilnisky,
Response, in REJECTED 56, 67 (George B. Shepherd ed., 1995).
132 See DAVID SHATZ, PEER REVIEW 10 (2004); see also Chichilnisky, supra note 131,
at 57 ("In my experience, the more innovative and interesting the paper, the more
likely it is to be rejected . . ").
133 See DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARDJ. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE 90 (1990) (argu-
ing that journal peer review works against innovation and reinforces scientific
dogma); GREGORY N. DERRY, WHAT SCIENCE IS AND How IT WORKS 138 (1999) ("Very
innovative ideas and unexpected results tend to get selectively filtered out, making
peer review a force for conservatism in science."); KUHN, supra note 16, at 64-65
(explaining that resistance to change will be strong and long-lasting when a new claim
challenges well-accepted paradigms).
134 See SHATZ, supra note 132, at 45-48 (explaining how bias operates in peer
review).
135 One commentator argues that many reviewers "are against innovation unless it
is their innovation" because "[i] nnovation from others may... diminish[ ] the impor-
tance of the scientist's own work." Horrobin, supra note 130, at 1441.
136 See STEVE FULLER, SCIENCE 65 (1997) (explaining that since each scientific dis-
cipline has a few gatekeepers who pass judgment on everyone else, offending one
"can be disastrous, much like failure to pay protection money to the local mafia
boss").
137 See Horrobin, supra note 130, at 1438 ("Quality control is one means of achiev-
ing an end, but it is not the end itself."); id. at 1439 (arguing that any marginal
improvement gained in research quality from rejecting a manuscript is no gain at all
if it is done at the expense of innovation).
138 See David F. Horrobin, Peer Review: A Philosophically Faulty Concept Which Is Prov-
ing Disastrous for Science, 5 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 217, 218 (1982) (arguing that since
brilliance is rare, a less-than-brilliant reviewer probably would not recognize it and
reject the claim), reprinted in PEER COMMENTARY ON PEER REVIEW 33, 34 (Stevan
Hamad ed. 1982).
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in the field. 139 If the gatekeepers do not credit the finding until time
L, the applicant will face an inevitable rejection. Importantly, refiling
at or beyond time L is often not a viable option because things have
happened which probably have compromised patent rights. 140
3. Subjective Bias
The history of science teaches that what was impossible yesterday
may be possible today.' 41 Precisely when the impossible becomes pos-
sible depends on several factors, including the nature of the technol-
ogy, the rate at which knowledge grows within a particular field,
ingenuity, and serendipity. 142 Yet regardless of when this moment
occurs, it can still take years for mainstream science to credit the
claim.143
There is a similar credibility lag in patent law. Particularly suscep-
tible to it are inventions emerging from nascent technologies; fields in
rapid change, in a primitive stage of development, or in the midst of a
technological renaissance; and quests which have a poor track record
of success. 144 Nevertheless, there will be some lag whenever the PTO
looks to mainstream science to determine if the applicant's assertions
are credible in light of contemporary knowledge because any lag that
exists in mainstream science will unavoidably pass through to the pat-
ent system.
139 See supra Part II.B.2.
140 For example, the Patent Act contains the loss-of-right provision discussed ear-
lier, § 102(b), which precludes patentability for the inventor's own conduct. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Particularly relevant here is that an inventor who discloses
the invention in a printed publication (including a published patent application)
more than one year before filing cannot obtain a patent. In the context of the hypo-
thetical, this means that the application filed at time Tcan defeat patentability at time
L. See In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
141 See CEESJ. HAMELINK, THE TECHNOLOGY GAMBLE, at x (1988) ("[T]he future
cannot be seen as the linear extension of the past and it is essential to believe that
what was impossible yesterday is tomorrow's possibility!"); H. LEE MARTIN, TECHO-
NOMIcS 89 (2006) ("[W]hat was impossible yesterday.., becomes possible today and
commonplace tomorrow.").
142 See, e.g., LESLIE ALAN HORVITZ, EUREKA! 1-10 (2002) (exploring various
factors).
143 See supra Part II.B.1.
144 See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (generating
energy with "cold fusion"); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (claim-
ing a perpetual motion machine); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (using a magnetic field to alter the taste of food); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (claiming a method for controlling the aging process); In re Ruskin,
354 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (increasing the energy output of fossil fuels through
exposure to a magnetic field).
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Yet, the patent system exacerbates and protracts any artifactual
lag stemming from mainstream science. Structural and substantive
aspects of patent examination cause a technological lag. Given the
technical nature of the examiner's job, one might expect this individ-
ual to know exactly what is happening at the forefront of theory and
experiment. This is typically not the case because the examiner is not
an active researcher.1 45 The incentive structure of the PTO combined
with the examiner's time pressures and production goals afford little,
if any, time for professional development. 146 These realities essen-
tially divorce examiners from the frontlines of science. 147 The same is
true, perhaps even more so, for the judges who hear patent cases. 148
Consequently, patent law inevitably lags a step or two behind the cut-
ting edge of science and technology.
Compounding this is evidence of bias against seemingly impossi-
ble inventions. History reveals that the PTO and the courts have
approached seemingly impossible claims with skepticism for the sake
of the public good. As the argument goes, there is a belief (albeit an
incorrect one) among the public and potential investors that the gov-
ernment never issues patents on inoperable inventions. 149 So strict
145 See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the Duty
of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 205,
224-29 (2002) (explaining that examiners do not have research laboratories and have
limited access to pertinent technical information).
146 SeeJoseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 944-45 (2004) (discussing biased procedures
at the PTO which favor hasty examiner analysis and skewed incentives); Arti K. Rai,
Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest for Managerial
Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2063-67 (2009) (describing examiner compensation
and incentives). The amount of time the PTO allots for an examiner to dispose of a
case depends on factors like seniority and the technology involved. See U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-527T, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING
EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT To REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOC 7 (2008),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08527t.pdf (discussing production
goals).
147 For thoughts on how this technology gap affects patent examination, seeJAMES
BESSEN & MICHAELJ. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 161 (2008), suggesting that the exam-
iners' unfamiliarly with new technologies and lack of knowledge may hurt patent
examination quality; and John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 314 (2007), contending that "patent examin-
ers unfamiliar with a cutting-edge technology like software may be less capable of
assessing the quality of the disclosure or of the innovation than they are in technologi-
cal areas with which they are more familiar".
148 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
149 See Daniel C. Rislove, Comment, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: Why Is the
USPTO Patenting Pseudoscience?, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1280.
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policing of incredible claims protects both the public from potentially
harmful products that do not work as claimed and potential investors
from patentees who might seek to defraud them.150 Judge Giles Rich
agreed, arguing that "it is against public policy to place the oblique
imprimatur of the Government via the patent grant on incredible or
misleading unproven assertions. '" 151 So elucidating what a PHOSITA
would believe can possibly devolve into a subjective judgment about
the subject matter. Thus, for some quests, the PTO and the courts
may develop a bias against patentability.
History shows, however, that technical merit and good science
can ultimately triumph over skepticism and subjective bias. Perhaps
the best example is the quest to treat cancer. For most of the twenti-
eth century, the PTO and the courts took the position that it was
150 See id. For example, there was a time when the PTO and several judges
believed that clinical evidence or FDA approval should have been a prerequisite for
patenting drugs which appeared unsafe or risky. Compare In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249,
261 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Smith,J., concurring) (criticizing the PTO's position that it was
carrying out its "statutory duty" when it required proof of "safety and effectiveness in
man"), with id. at 263-66 (Worley, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing with the PTO that Con-
gress intended for it to work cooperatively with other agencies to ensure safety and
effectiveness). Now it is clear that drug safety is not the PTO's responsibility. See
Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that § 101 and
other provisions of the patent statutes do not establish safety as a patentability crite-
rion); In reAnthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (same); see also In reSichert,
566 F.2d 1154, 1160 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting that a minimal level of safety will satisfy
§ 101).
151 In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1963); cf Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F.
Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1957) (contenting that the patent grant "gives a kind of official
imprimatur to the [invention] in question on which as a moral matter some members
of the public are likely to rely"). The fear is that some might view the patent grant,
albeit improperly, as the government's endorsement of the technology. See Cynthia
M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 247, 253 n.29 (2000) (noting that issuing patents covering
controversial technologies might be viewed as a government endorsement of it);
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573,
599-600 (2006) (explaining that governments may choose to deny patents on certain
inventions in order to eliminate the signal of perceived endorsement or encourage-
ment). Relatedly, it is also true that "a [patentee] may advertise its patent to convince
gullible consumers that a patent represents the government's endorsement or impri-
matur that the advertised product is actually effective." Christopher R. Leslie, Patents
of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 144 (2008). For a view contrary to Citron and Isenstead,
see In re Hartop, 311 F.2d at 263, stating, "[T]he issuance of a patent is not in fact an
'imprimatur' as to the safety and effectiveness .... [A patent] is no guarantee of
anything .... The public, therefore, is in no way protected either by the granting or
withholding of a patent."
[VOL. 86:52o86
ATYPICAL INVENTIONS
impossible to do so successfully.1 52 Applicants claiming an effective
treatment faced a formidable (if not insurmountable) patentability
hurdle because the C.C.P.A. allowed the PTO to demand substantiat-
ing evidence from the applicant. 153 But, the situation finally changed
in 1980 when the court determined that successfully treating cancer is
not inherently unbelievable. 15 4 Fifteen years later, the Federal Circuit
put the issue to rest when it stated that treating cancer with chemical
compounds "does not suggest an inherently unbelievable undertaking
or involve implausible scientific principles" because "[m]odern sci-
ence has previously identified numerous successful chemotherapeutic
agents."1 55  Similar stories abound for inventions initially (but
wrongly) miscategorized by the PTO and the courts as impossible.
C. Refocusing the Inquiry
1. Normative Thoughts
As a normative matter, the current framework is unsettling for at
least three reasons. First, science has evolved to a point where "the
levels of complexity and specialization make it nearly impossible for [any-
one]-who is not intimately familiar with the activity-to effectively
and credibly evaluate it and its outcomes."' 5 6 Second, given that oper-
ability is an objective question (an invention either works or it does
not), an applicant who presents a meritorious claim should not face
rejection because of subjective credibility assessments. Third, credibil-
ity lags prevent the patent system from sitting at the cutting edge of
technology, 15 7 a place where patent protection is often crucial. 158
152 See, e.g., In re Citron, 325 F.2d at 253 (explaining that an effective cure for
cancer appeared to be incredible in light of knowledge in the art); Ex parte Moore,
128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8, 9-10 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960) (determining that any sugges-
tion that the claimed compounds could treat cancer was incredible and misleading).
153 See In re Citron, 325 F.2d at 253 (determining that this was an appropriate stan-
dard for an invention "of as much public importance as is the effective treatment of
cancer"); In re Novak, 306 F.2d 924, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
154 See In reJolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (reversing a rejection
for a drug claiming to effectively induce remission in leukemia patients).
155 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As to the issue of heightened
proof for therapeutics, the court has noted that requiring evidence such as FDA
approval to satisfy § 101 could "eliminat[e] an incentive to pursue, through research
and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of can-
cer." Id. at 1568.
156 GEISLER, supra note 129, at 219.
157 See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989) (noting that the patent system seeks to incentivize inventors who in turn pro-
vide the public with new and useful advances in technology); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PAT-
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2. Alternative Screening Tools
It is time to consider alternative approaches for screening out
truly impossible inventions. One possibility would be to employ the
enablement requirement of § 112 paragraph 1. It is well suited to per-
form this task because enablement and operability are closely
related. 159 Aside from policing claim scope, 160 it ensures that a
PHOSITA can actually make and use what the applicant discloses. 16'
Operability and enablement both help to safeguard the technical
integrity of issued patents by screening out inventions that cannot
work. 162
ENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 41 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (explain-
ing that accommodating new technologies is crucial for innovation); cf. Robert P.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 803, 876 (1988) (arguing that the patent system should not employ a
patentability test which compromises its primary goal to promote technological
progress).
158 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1495, 1504-05 (2001) (suggesting that a firm may obtain a patent to "stake their
claim" in an area of technology to signal to investors and competitors that it operates
at the cutting edge); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 647-49
(2002) (arguing that firms obtain patents to show their R&D acumen or technological
capacity).
159 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
160 See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1853) (explaining that a
patentee "can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if he
claims more his patent is void"); Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation
Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that the purpose of the
enablement requirement is to "ensure [ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by
the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the
claims"). The scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written descrip-
tion plus what is known by a PHOSITA "without undue experimentation." See id.
161 See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("The enablement requirement ensures . . . 'that a specification shall disclose an
invention in such a manner as will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilize
it.'" (quoting In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
162 As the Federal Circuit recently explained:
Enablement is closely related to the requirement for utility .... [which]
prevents mere ideas from being patented. As we noted [previously],
"[p]atent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an
invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be
workable .... Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute
enabling disclosure."
In re '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (fourth
and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108
F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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More importantly, the enablement analysis is rooted in objective,
technical factors. This lies in contrast to the subjective credibility
assessments that lie at the heart of the § 101 operability paradigm.
Analytically, this means that the decisionmaker can use technical fac-
tors like claim breadth and the substantive content of the applicant's
disclosure to achieve the same ends as the current operability regime
without its pitfalls.
There is some decisional law which supports the proposition that
if the case for nonenablement is very strong, that is a sufficient basis to
deny patentability notwithstanding deficiencies under § 101. In In re
Speas,16 3 the applicant sought to claim
any and all devices and systems which operate in such a manner as
to violate the [S]econd [L]aw of [T]hermodynamics as it is cur-
rently understood and accepted as inviolable by a majority of the
worldwide scientific community, and any and all devices and systems
which are adapted for converting thermal energy into other energy
forms by contacting a heat source without the necessity of also con-
tacting a thermal medium of lower temperature.' 64
It is important to note two points about these claims. First, the
"any and all" claim language immediately raises enablement concerns
due to its potentially limitless breadth. 1 65 Second, any device that
could continuously convert heat completely to work without any addi-
tional energy input would violate the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics. 1 66 A closer look at the applicant's description of the invention
reveals, however, that the disclosed device does not do so because it
actually draws in thermal energy from the surroundings.
1 67
The examiner rejected the claim independently under § 112 par-
agraph 1 and § 101, respectively, after determining that (1) the
163 273 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (nonprecedential).
164 Id. at 946 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the
applicant failed to enable a claim covering "any and all live, non-pathogenic vaccines,
and processes for making such vaccines").
166 The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that it is impossible to convert heat
completely to work without some energy loss. See R.K. RAJPUT, ENGINEERING THERMO-
tDYNAMIcs 232 (3d ed. 2010). A machine that could do so would be 100% efficient.
Such machines are referred to as perpetual motion machines of the second kind. See
id. Curiously, the term "perpetual motion" does not appear either in the PTO docu-
ments or in the Federal Circuit opinion.
167 See In re Speas, 273 F. App'x at 946 ("Thus, the movement of the ferrofluid
imparts mechanical energy upon the wheel. Speas claims that because this ferrofluid
is moved and adds energy to the paddle wheel 'without input into the system other
than ambient thermal energy,' it is proof that the [S]econd [L]aw of
[T]hermodynamics is not inviolate-an object of the invention.").
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enablement provided was not commensurate with the claim scope
sought and (2) the invention could not achieve the intended result.168
The Board explicitly affirmed each rejection. 169 Although the PTO
argued both issues in its appeal brief to the Federal Circuit, it con-
tended that the court could resolve the case solely on enablement
grounds with no need to reach the § 101 issue. 170 This argument
makes sense because if the disclosed device did not violate the Second
Law of Thermodynamics, it was nonenabled.
The Federal Circuit adopted this reasoning and affirmed on
nonenablement grounds. The court held that the Board's rejection
was supported by substantial evidence because the applicant's "partic-
ularly broad" and "limitless" claim was not enabled by a description
which was commensurately broad in its teaching.' 7 ' The important
point is that it was possible to screen out this invention solely based on
(a lack of) technical merit, thereby avoiding any need to engage in a
credibility assessment.' 72
CONCLUSION
Inventions which arise through unexpected discoveries and those
which purport to have achieved the impossible perform a special role
in science and technology because breakthroughs can lead to a para-
digm shift in thinking and novel approaches to problem solving. For
patent law, these inventions have a high likelihood of stimulating sig-
nificant creative activity and ultimately promoting its overarching goal
to promote scientific and technological progress. Thus, the patent
system suffers when these inventions fall victim to the ill effects of the
disconnect between it and science and technology. The widespread
interest in patent reform makes now an ideal time to reformulate pat-
ent doctrines to better accommodate the technical communities that
it serves.
168 See id. at 945-46; Brief for Appellee Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office at 7-8, In re Speas, 273 F. App'x 945 (No. 2008-1076) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellee].
169 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 168, at 9-10.
170 See id. at 18.
171 See In re Speas, 273 F. App'x at 946.
172 In his commentary on In re Speas, Professor Crouch reached a similar conclu-
sion: "Although this type of case is fun to read, it also provides an interesting lesson-
that [there are] tools to reject inadequate patent applications on their merits without
resorting to broad exclusions of particular subject matter," Dennis Crouch, CAFC
Rejects Patent on Invention to Overcome the Second Law of Thermodynamics, PATENTLY-O
(May 1, 2008, 2:32 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/05/cafc-rejects-pa.
html.
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